Aid cuts will fill more dinghies than smugglers ever could

It is also, somehow, routinely described as a "forgotten war." Estimates of the dead now range from 150,000 to 400,000. Nearly 25 million people are affected by famine, and around 4 million children are acutely malnourished. The United Nations has called it the worst humanitarian crisis in the world for women and girls, who make up over half of the displaced and are being deliberately targeted with sexual violence.

More than 11 million people have been forced from their homes inside Sudan alone, with several million more having crossed international borders. I saw the consequences for myself on a recent visit to Egypt with the Coalition for Global Prosperity. What I found was a reminder that a war can start as a domestic power struggle and end up as a crisis with continental and, I would argue, very direct British consequences.

Egypt now hosts approximately 1.5 million registered refugees who have fled the Sudanese conflict, placing enormous pressure on communities and humanitarian services. Unlike some of its neighbours, Egypt has never built a single refugee camp, so these are people living in Cairo and beyond.

At a UNHCR reception centre in Giza, I watched a system built to register 4000 people a month straining to 4,000 arrivals a day -  mostly women and children, and older men, all of whom had fled their homes because of the war. Some had travelled roughly 1,400km from the Sudanese border just to get there.

UNHCR's Egypt operation is currently only 26 per cent funded against its $133.5 million requirement for the year, down from 47 per cent in 2024. Two of the three registration centres in Egypt have already closed despite the increased demand. More than half of Sudanese refugees in Egypt are considered extremely vulnerable; around 58 per cent are food insecure.

So why does this matter to the UK, beyond the sheer awfulness of it?

Because in polling from both YouGov and Ipsos, migration consistently ranks as the single biggest concern for the British public -  and it is specifically illegal migration that drives that concern.

Of Sudan's displaced, some 1.5 million have ended up in Egypt. And the evidence is now clear that many do not intend to stay there. Cross-border movement into Egypt surged 230 per cent in 2025, notably from Sudan. Sudanese refugees are now among the main nationalities making the dangerous Mediterranean crossing from Libya, largely departing from Tobruk. Sudanese migration to Europe rose 52 per cent between January and May 2026 compared with the same months in 2025 -  the clearest possible sign that reduced protection in the region is pushing people onward.

Eventually, a proportion of them will end up on UK shores, having crossed the Channel in a dinghy.

This is the connection that too much of our debate on small boats misses entirely. As William Hague put it recently in The Times, building a fortress at our own border is not enough on its own - a fortress cannot survive if it shows no interest in what is happening over the horizon. At the moment, in effect, all we are doing is topping up the oil each day without asking why the engine is leaking in the first place.

My view on migration is straightforward, and I don't think it's controversial: every country has the right to set its own immigration rules, and those rules should be respected and enforced in full. But migration, managed properly, can also be a force for good -  and ending small boat crossings has to mean tackling the reasons people get into them in the first place, not just the boats themselves.

That means taking seriously what is happening in places like Egypt, right now. The UK has, to its credit, protected its humanitarian commitment to Sudan -  £146 million for 2026/27, alongside increased support for local organisations and additional funding to help migrants and host communities across North Africa. That money is reaching real people; I saw some of the programmes it funds during my visit. The FCDO-funded NAMAD project, for example, has supported over 22,400 migrants and host community members since 2024 - through protection services, cash assistance and livelihood training.

But it sits alongside a wider trend that runs counter to our own interests. UK aid spending has fallen from a high of 0.7 per cent of GNI under David Cameron's government, to 0.5 per cent after Covid, and is now on course to fall further still, to just 0.3 per cent. Some argue this trade-off is necessary to fund domestic priorities. I think it is a false economy. We have the opportunity to support the issue ‘upstream’ – by properly supporting projects in countries like Egypt, which themselves will reduce the demand for so-called ‘irregular’ migration.

As our relationship with Egypt deepens into a full strategic partnership, we must build humanitarian and migration cooperation into it from the start, rather than treating it as an afterthought. Egypt is increasingly an anchor of stability in an unstable region. That is precisely why we should invest in it properly, not take it for granted.

The UK cannot solve Sudan's war alone. Supporting refugees and host communities closer to Sudan provides safety and stability, and it reduces the pressure that drives people toward dangerous onward journeys. It is the right thing to do, but it is also the strategic thing to do.

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Stewart Harper is Vice President of The National Conservative Convention and a Member of the Conservative Party Board.

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