Britain has finally recognised the threat from IRGC. It should never have taken this long
This decision should not be viewed as symbolic, writes defence expert Barak M. Seener
For years, Britain's approach to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has been defined by hesitation.
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While allies steadily hardened their response to Tehran's network of proxy warfare, transnational repression and covert operations, successive UK governments preferred targeted sanctions and diplomatic caution. That era has now come to an end.
The Government's decision to designate the IRGC following a succession of escalating threats linked to Iran represents a long-overdue recognition that the organisation is not simply another branch of a foreign military. It is the principal instrument through which the Iranian regime exports intimidation, terrorism and political violence far beyond its borders. The question is not why Britain has acted. It is why it took so long.
I authored a report for the Henry Jackson Society entitled ‘The Long Arm of Tehran: Why the UK Should Ban the IRGC’, which was published in April 2025 and laid out the evidence in stark detail over a year before the Government's decision. It documented the IRGC's extensive operational footprint across Europe, detailing how Tehran relies not only on its own operatives but also on organised crime, proxies and local networks to conduct surveillance, intimidation and plots against journalists, dissidents, Jewish communities and perceived enemies of the regime.
The report argued that Britain had become increasingly exposed to these activities while remaining behind states including the US, Canada, EU, Australia and Gulf States that had already proscribed the IRGC as a terrorist organisation.
The British government likely came under increased pressure from the US to proscribe the IRGC as a terrorist organisation.
This pressure was unwarranted as British intelligence had repeatedly warned of a growing number of Iran-linked plots targeting individuals on UK soil. Rather than relying solely on traditional terrorist cells, the IRGC has increasingly embraced hybrid tactics—combining cyber operations, criminal proxies, espionage and intimidation.
Against this backdrop, the Government's previous reluctance became increasingly difficult to justify. Ministers frequently argued that proscribing the IRGC could complicate diplomatic relations with Iran or create legal difficulties because the organisation forms part of the Iranian state. Those concerns were unsustainable in the aftermath of ‘Operation Epic Fury’ against Iran and reflected an outdated calculation that diplomatic sensitivities outweighed mounting security risks.
This decision should not be viewed as symbolic. Designating the IRGC strengthens the legal framework available to law enforcement and intelligence agencies, making it significantly harder for supporters, facilitators and front organisations to operate with impunity. It sends an unmistakable message that Britain will no longer distinguish between acts carried out directly by the regime abroad and those outsourced by the IRGC through proxies or criminal intermediaries on British soil.
Britain must follow through its proscription of the IRGC with robust enforcement. Financial networks linked to the IRGC require sustained disruption. Universities, businesses and research institutions must be prevented from partnering with their Iranian counterparts which are linked to the IRGC. Law enforcement agencies must continue prioritising the protection of dissidents and communities targeted by Tehran's transnational repression. Above all, government must recognise that hostile state activity increasingly blurs the line between espionage, organised crime and terrorism.
Britain's decision to act is overdue, but it is also an admission that the IRGC’s threat had outgrown the country's slow response to shore up its security. Having finally caught up with the reality of the IRGC's dangerous nature, Britain’s task now is to ensure it does not fall behind again.
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Barak M. Seener is an Associate Fellow of the Henry Jackson Society and author of the report ‘The Long Arm of Tehran: Why the UK Should Ban the IRGC’
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