Elon Musk is no fan of Keir Starmer. What happens if we can’t use his satellites?

It depends on something far less visible but just as decisive: connectivity. Secure, resilient communications now underpin everything from troop coordination and drone deployments to intelligence sharing and  logistics. That reality raises an uncomfortable question for the UK and its allies. What happens if that connectivity is controlled not by governments, but by private companies?

Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite network has played a vital role in Ukraine since the early days of the war. It enabled frontline units to communicate when traditional infrastructure was destroyed and provided a level of connectivity that many militaries had not anticipated needing at such scale. Ukrainian officials have repeatedly credited Starlink with keeping communications alive during critical phases of the conflict, particularly when fibre and mobile networks were knocked out by Russian strikes. Yet Starlink is not a state asset. It is owned and operated by a private company, and its use has been restricted, altered or paused during critical offensives. Those decisions were not driven by military necessity or democratic oversight, but by commercial and personal judgement.

This is not an argument about clashing personalities or politics. It is simply about preparedness, resilience and digital sovereignty. If UK forces were to deploy in a contested environment, whether in Eastern Europe or elsewhere, relying on a single privately owned satellite system would introduce a strategic vulnerability that no serious defence planner should ignore.

In 2022 and 2023, there were multiple reports that Starlink coverage was limited or disabled in certain areas of Ukraine, with Musk later confirming that the service had been constrained to avoid escalation. More recently, there have been public discussions by prominent European politicians about the extent to which Starlink could or should be relied upon by NATO-aligned forces in future conflicts. These episodes served as a reminder that access to critical communications can ultimately depend on decisions made far from the battlefield.

More importantly, we have seen how adversaries actively target space-based communications. Russia has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to jam, spoof or interfere with satellite signals, including those used by British and allied forces. UK defence officials have acknowledged incidents of Russian electronic warfare disrupting satellite-based navigation and communications in and around Eastern Europe. These actions underline a critical point: space is no longer a sanctuary, and satellite dominance can no longer be assumed.

In this context, the question is not whether Starlink is valuable. It clearly is. The question is whether it should ever be the sole or primary means of communication in a high-stakes military environment. The answer, from a strategic perspective, must be no.Military communications have traditionally relied on multi-layered backup plans. If one system fails, another takes over. Whilst that principle has not disappeared, it has also not kept pace with how warfare has evolved. As operations become more data-driven and more dependent on constant connectivity, the consequences of a single point of failure grow more severe.

The UK therefore needs to think beyond satellites alone. That means investing in alternative and complementary communications technologies that can operate independently of space-based systems. High-capacity terrestrial wireless networks, advanced radio frequency systems, mesh networks and resilient point-to-point links all have roles to play. Some of these technologies can be rapidly deployed, are harder to jam, and can operate even when satellite access is degraded or denied.

Crucially, these systems can be owned, controlled and governed domestically or within a wider net of trusted alliances. That control matters. In a conflict scenario, the ability to guarantee access to communications infrastructure is as important as the ability to deploy troops or equipment. Dependence on one single external actor, however innovative or well intentioned, introduces uncertainty into decision making at the worst possible moment. Governments must ensure that no single commercial provider, satellite-based or otherwise, becomes indispensable.

There is also a broader lesson here about how warfare itself is changing. Conflicts are increasingly contested across multiple domains simultaneously: land, sea, air, cyber and space. Communications sit at the centre of all of them. Adversaries no longer need to destroy physical assets to disrupt operations. They can interfere with signals, overwhelm networks or exploit overreliance on specific technologies.

Preparing for this reality requires a shift in mindset. Resilience must be designed in from the outset, not bolted on as an afterthought. Defence procurement needs to prioritise systems that can operate in degraded environments and alongside other technologies, rather than replacing them.

The UK has the technical expertise and industrial capability to do this. What is required now is strategic clarity. Communication resilience should be treated as a core element of national defence, not a supporting function. That means sustained investment, rigorous testing and clear contingency planning.

None of this diminishes the importance of satellite communications. Satellites will remain a crucial part of modern military operations. But they must be part of a diversified ecosystem, not the backbone on which everything else depends.

If the past few years have taught us anything, it is that geopolitical stability cannot be taken for granted. Preparing for uncertainty is not pessimism. Ensuring that UK forces can communicate securely, reliably and independently, regardless of who owns which satellites, is sensible planning and a strategic necessity.

__________________

James Campion, Wireless Communications Expert and CEO and Co-founder of TERASi

LBC Opinion provides a platform for diverse opinions on current affairs and matters of public interest.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official LBC position.

To contact us email opinion@lbc.co.uk