Putin’s false flag strategy is creeping into Nato, with Latvia at highest risk

Whilst Putin does not necessarily need parliamentary approval to send troops into its neighbouring states, the new law signals a continued willingness to manufacture pretexts for invasion using identity-based disinformation.

For the Baltic states which have large Russian populations, and Latvia in particular, this is of great concern.

The purported “protection” of so-called compatriots has never been an altruistic mission for the Kremlin. Instead, it is a mechanism to expand Russia’s boundaries.

Indeed, during the reigns of Peter the Great and his successors, the unification of Orthodox peoples under the Russian Orthodox Church served as both a spiritual and civilisational rationalisation for imperial expansion westward and southward.

Today, Putin and many within Russia’s military leadership frame expansionism as both a strategic imperative and a civilisational mission. Their rhetoric implies that populations with ethnic or linguistic ties to Russia belong under Moscow’s authority.

By this logic, states with significant Russian-speaking populations are illegitimate in the eyes of the Kremlin. This narrative has already caused the largest war in Europe since 1945 and has brought the entire continent to the brink.

The role of civilisational disinformation was evident in Ukraine both in 2014 and 2022. The annexation of Crimea was preceded by false narratives portraying the peninsula and eastern Ukraine as Russian.

The concept of a “Russian World”, false claims that the Ukrainian government posed an existential threat to ethnic Russians, and the view that alignment with the West would erode cultural identity were deployed to make parts of the population more willing to accept, or even support, Russian aggression.

Following the start of the full-scale invasion, the use of civilisational disinformation campaigns has not diminished. Instead, they continue to lay the groundwork for invasions, including in NATO territory.

Narratives deployed in Ukraine are visible across the Baltics, where they aim to erode political trust and social cohesion. By heightening ethnic tensions through disinformation, Russia seeks to fabricate conditions that could later be used to justify military action against NATO member states.

Latvia, in particular, faces one of the most severe security challenges due to Russian disinformation. A quarter of the Latvian population is ethnically Russian and a third speak Russian as their first language.

In Daugavpils, the largest city in the region of Latgale - which borders both Russia and Belarus - and Latvia’s second-largest city, Russians make up almost 50% of the population compared to a Latvian-ethnic population of just 19%.

These demographic divisions have been reflected in media consumption habits. Prior to the restrictions on Russian media in the early 2020s, Kremlin-linked news outlets were among some of the most watched and read.

Even after these bans, many individuals have circumvented restrictions. The Atlantic Council estimates that around 20% of Latvia’s Russian-speaking viewers still access banned Russian state TV through VPNs. Similarly, Russia merely changed the domain names of websites to allow audiences in Latvia to continue reading their output.

Telegram, meanwhile, has allowed content to easily reach audiences in the Baltics, with Russia’s intelligence services using it to spark unrest and spread hostile narratives to destabilise the country.

The narratives promoted by the Kremlin across Latvia’s information space closely mirror those used in Ukraine. Claims that the Latvian state is Russophobic or engaged in ethnocide are prominent themes. Through social media and proxy networks, these messages allege forced deportations, segregation in public life, and deliberate attempts by Baltic governments to provoke conflict with Russia.

The aim is to either increase the prominence of pro-Russian parties or create an artificial justification for a small-scale Russian incursion into eastern Latvia.

Evidence suggests that these narratives are having effects. In 2024, Latvia’s State Security Service found that 24% of aggressive social media comments were aimed at inciting national, ethnic, racial and social hatred, and 26% threatened or called for violence against state officials.

These are evidently linked to the Kremlin’s disinformation. They have even been able to influence behaviour. During the Covid-19 pandemic, conspiracy theories portraying Western vaccines as harmful significantly affected vaccine uptake among Russian-speaking communities.

By late 2021, as noted by Keir Giles, 80% of Latvia’s Covid-19 patients in hospital were Russian speakers, highlighting how Russia has been able to deepen social divisions and undermine public trust.

Whilst Latvia and its Baltic neighbours have done much to build societal resilience to disinformation, as shown in a recent Coalition for Global Prosperity report, the intensity and aggression of Russian propaganda is increasing. Vulnerabilities remain and are likely to be exploited.

Russia’s new law does not mark a significant change in Russian strategy. For centuries, Russia has propagated the mythological idea of a Russian World and used it for the purpose of aggression.

Nevertheless, failing to recognise that Russian disinformation efforts go beyond Ukraine and into NATO territory risks the potential for future illegal landgrabs, framed as a ‘liberation’ similar to the false flags of 2014 and 2022.

In such an eventuality, Europe could once again face the prospect of full-scale war.

_

Thomas Nurcombe is Research Manager at the Coalition for Global Prosperity

LBC Opinion provides a platform for diverse opinions on current affairs and matters of public interest.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official LBC position.

To contact us email opinion@lbc.co.uk