The UK and Australia are betting on each other

The 2+2 ministerial (called so because it involves the foreign and defence ministers from both sides) was a celebration of UK staying power in the Indo-Pacific, coming shortly after 3,000 British troops took part in the Australian large Talisman Sabre military exercise (this year’s was particularly big and included troop contributions from 19 countries).

It was also marked by the arrival of the UK’s 70,000-tonne aircraft carrier, HMS Prince of Wales. It was most likely the largest display of British military power in Australia since the end of the Second World War.

While the UK and Australia have a long shared military relationship, it has been dormant for much of the post-war period, a marker of constraints “east of Suez” on MOD forces in Asia, and the prioritisation of the Persian Gulf and Atlantic.

For much of the Cold War and post-Cold War era, Britain has concentrated its forces on Europe and the Middle East. The rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), its expansionist policies in the South China Sea - a major global trade route upon which Britain relies - and the diplomatic pull of various UK allies in the region have seen London “tilt” back towards the Indo-Pacific.

While it cannot match the same military might as the United States and the PRC—the two powers most engaged in contesting power and order in the region—the UK brings with it invaluable assets to countries like Australia.

For one, the UK remains one of the most advanced technological powers in the world and despite years of low research and development spending, remains competitive in aerospace, artificial intelligence, and integrated systems. While the headline deal was around the AUKUS submarine deal - predicted to bring £20 billion in exports and 7,000 jobs to UK shipyards over the next 25 years - there is much that London and Canberra can do in Pillar 2, the still-untapped agreement that focuses AUKUS on quantum, hypersonic missiles, AI, autonomy, cyber, and electronic warfare.

British companies constitute around 7.5% of the top 100 defence industrial companies. There is the additional value of the geopolitical signal that the relationship sends adversaries: Canberra and London have built their security relationships around the anchor point of alliances. The value of this will tell over the coming years as the world sees countries like the PRC, Russia, Iran, and North Korea cooperating more and more across the world.

While AUKMIN 2025 is to be lauded, there are real questions on the horizon: how will the US review of AUKUS go? What will happen to Pillar 2 if Pillar 1 falls by the wayside? In some ways, AUKMIN is a bet that this won’t happen (and possibly that both capitals can power through even if it does).

With the US perceived as less reliable than it once was, however, both nations would do well to invest further in the relationship, and consider upgrading their partnership to a formal alliance - replete with a potential mutual defence obligation.

Given the budgetary constraints faced by both in raising defence spending, there is also ample opportunity for them to look for the economic benefits, the so-called ‘defence dividend’. How they divide such benefits is still to be determined, but this week’s AUKMIN was a massive indicator of the appetite.

________________

Dr John Hemmings is Deputy Director at the Council on Geostrategy and a Senior Adviser at the Pacific Forum.

LBC Opinion provides a platform for diverse opinions on current affairs and matters of public interest.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official LBC position.

To contact us email opinion@lbc.co.uk