Trump's pressure campaign worked - Iran proved it

If anything, this pause in hostilities underscores a more enduring reality, that this is not a discrete conflict with a clear endpoint, but another chapter in a strategic struggle that has persisted since 1979 and one that is likely to fester for a few more years to come.

Understanding the current outcome requires clarity about the differing aims of the three main actors. For Washington and Jerusalem, their objectives have long converged. At their most ambitious, these include either regime change in Tehran or, at a minimum, a fundamental shift in the behaviour of the Islamic Republic’s theocratic regime.

Alongside this, sits a more operational set of goals: the degradation or destruction of Iran’s nuclear programme; the weakening of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ capacity to project power and influence through proxies such as Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis; and the neutralisation of Iran’s ability to directly threaten Israel and other regional actors.

Broader still, are ambitions to restore stability to hydrocarbon markets, curtail Iran’s provision of lethal aid to Russia, and ultimately reshape the regional balance of power in favour of a US-aligned order. While these outcomes were the main objectives of the US-Israeli operation, they are also likely to yield positive results for many Middle East States and the Western powers too.

Iran’s position, by contrast, has been reactive, more defensive and predictably asymmetric in nature. While lacking the combined conventional military superiority of the US and Israel, Tehran has long relied on strategic leverage points, most notably its geographic control over the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint through which a significant proportion of the world’s energy supply flows. This has provided Iran with a potent, if risky, means of influencing global economic stability.

Against this backdrop, the immediate outcomes of the ceasefire appear, at least superficially, to favour the US and Israel. Their military capabilities remain largely intact, having absorbed and repelled substantial Iranian strikes. There is little evidence, at this stage, of any decisive degradation of either their operational readiness or their overall deterrent posture in the region. Indeed, the fact that both states were able to sustain their positions under pressure reinforces the perception of enduring strength.

Iran, meanwhile, appears to have made significant concessions in the lead-up to the ceasefire. The rhetoric emanating from Washington, particularly the threats of overwhelming force and even the eradication of the Iranian state, seems to have had its intended coercive effect. Tehran’s agreement to de-escalate, including steps towards reopening the Strait of Hormuz, suggests a regime prioritising its own survival over the risk of escalation and ultimately its destruction.

Tehran’s reported list of ten conditions, many of which remain unmet and are unlikely to be fulfilled, further indicates a negotiating position constrained by circumstance rather than strength. Yet the fact that some traction is being made, through the effective negotiations of Pakistan and other regional powers, might suggest that Iran now has an acceptable ‘off ramp’ from which to de-escalate without losing too much face: if only within its own borders.

In this sense, it is not unreasonable to argue that Iran “blinked first”. For the leadership in Tehran, the preservation of the regime is – and will likely remain – paramount, but the overwhelming pressure from the US and Israel has unquestionably forced the Iranian regime to refine its level of ambition and with it, its strategic trajectory.

Faced with the prospect of intensified military confrontation and potential internal destabilisation, buying time through a ceasefire may have been the least-worst option. Yet such a move comes at a cost. The regional balance of power appears to be shifting with Gulf Cooperation Council states increasingly eclipsing Iran in diplomatic, military and economic terms.

There are also broader geopolitical implications. The global focus on Gaza, once the central axis of regional and international discourse, has markedly diminished in the wake of this confrontation. Iran, which has historically leveraged the Palestinian cause to bolster its own regional influence and legitimacy, may seek to return it to the forefront. However, Iran’s diminished leverage raises questions about how effectively it can do so and with Israel still determined to achieve its goals against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, Iran’s options are waning.

While it is a historic truism that every war must end, this ceasefire is not a suggestion that the US and Israel have secured a decisive military victory nor that the long-running conflict is over. Many of their core objectives, particularly those relating to Iran’s nuclear capabilities and long-term behavioural change, remain unclear at best or unresolved at worst. There is also a lack of clear evidence that Iran’s proxy networks have been decisively dismantled. These are complex, deeply embedded organisations with parallel structures that cannot be neutralised in a single campaign. Their removal and socio-political reintegration will take decades to achieve. This is a further reinforcement that we need to look at the strategic implications and outcomes in the longer term rather than in the present tense.

Nevertheless, the current trajectory does not resemble defeat for Washington or Jerusalem. On the contrary, the balance of advantage appears, for now, to lie with them. Their military resilience, combined with Iran’s apparent willingness to de-escalate under pressure, has created a strategic environment in which Trump and Netanyahu hold the strategic and operational initiatives.

The ceasefire, then, should be seen not as an end, but as the precursor of the next geo-political bound: a moment of recalibration before the next phase of this complicated and long-running Iran-Israel-US contest. In that context, the most accurate assessment may be this: the US and Israel have not yet won, but they are in a position where victory is theirs to lose.

____________________

Air Vice-Marshal Philip T. G. Lester CBE is a Former RAF 2 star officer with extensive experience of the Middle East including Israel and the Palestinian Territories.

LBC Opinion provides a platform for diverse opinions on current affairs and matters of public interest.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official LBC position.

To contact us email opinion@lbc.co.uk