Ukraine is changing the rules of naval warfare in the Black Sea

The traditional principle, in which a fleet’s effectiveness was determined by the number of ships, their tonnage, and missile armament, is gradually becoming obsolete. Instead, a new paradigm is emerging: the fleet as a system rather than a collection of platforms.

Analysis of events shows that Ukraine, having virtually no conventional large fleet, has managed to restrict the operational freedom of the Russian Federation’s Black Sea Fleet–which, until 2022, comprised up to 40 ships of various types and tonnages–and to displace it from key areas in the Black Sea. It became possible not through a symmetrical build-up of forces, but thanks to asymmetric solutions.

First and foremost, this involves integrating coastal missile systems, unmanned maritime systems and reconnaissance into a single network. As noted by Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrskyi, the Black Sea operational zone is one of those components of the battlefield where the Ukrainian Defence Forces dictate their terms to the enemy, disrupt its plans, and, most importantly, carry out their own active operations.

A telling example is the development of Ukrainian maritime drones, which have struck at least 17 Russian ships in the Black Sea. Their evolution from improvised solutions to multi-purpose platforms reflects a general trend: rapidness of adaptation is becoming more important than mass and cost. At a relatively low cost, such systems pose a significant threat to expensive ships, creating an ‘economic attrition’ effect on the enemy.

Examples of the use of modular configurations, including launching FPV drones from naval platforms and establishing various missile and small-arms systems, point to an expansion of functionality. In particular, Ukrainian naval drones have already struck aerial targets.

For instance, on 31 December 2024, a Russian Mi-8 helicopter over the Black Sea was shot down by a missile carried on a drone. Such solutions in drone technology pose additional risks not only to naval vessels but also to helicopters, which are traditionally used for patrols, anti-submarine defence or providing cover for naval task forces.

At the same time, the key factor is not just the platforms themselves, but their integration. The launch of the Integrated Maritime Awareness System signals a shift towards a network-centric model. This involves creating a unified information loop in which intelligence, target designation, and weapons systems are integrated in near real time. This is precisely what allows for the most effective use of dispersed, relatively inexpensive assets, compensating for the lack of large ships.

In a broader sense, the Black Sea has effectively become a testing ground for a new form of naval warfare. The Ukrainian approach challenges the classical model of power projection through large surface fleets and demonstrates that technological integration and flexibility can deliver strategic impact even with limited resources. It is no coincidence that NATO countries are already studying this experience and attempting to adapt certain elements, particularly in unmanned maritime systems.

Thus, it may be reasonably assumed that in the medium term, the notion of a “strong navy” will become progressively less defined by the number of vessels. Instead, the defining factors will be the level of integration, the speed of innovation and the capacity to operate within distributed networks. Ukraine is, in all likelihood, already shaping the contours of this new model.

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Anton Zemlianyi is a Senior Analyst at the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center.

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