The next war starts in space, and our systems may not survive it

But money alone is not enough. It takes years to build the industrial base, knowledge, skills, and talent pipeline needed to have a real effect. That is true across defence, but it is even more pronounced in space, and particularly in orbital defence.

Ukraine makes a useful case study. When GPS is degraded, Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) often become less accurate or drop off altogether.

Drones lose data, artillery units can't operate, and units slow down because they are no longer confident in the data they are working from. The opposite is true when those links hold; the same units operate very differently. They move faster, coordinate more easily, and make better use of the capabilities they have.

So modern militaries depend on space. The issue is that much of the architecture remains relatively fragile. A small number of systems carry a disproportionate share of the load, and many still depend on continuous control from the ground.

In a contested environment, those links will be degraded or denied altogether. When they get disrupted, the satellites will still be there, but the system they support will begin to degrade in ways that are difficult to recover from under pressure.

Redundancy changes the whole design of the force. In air and maritime operations, we use a more dispersed system, with smaller and more numerous vehicles that are harder to block or disrupt.

This allows tasks to be shared, rather than concentrated in a few high-value assets. That usually stands up well under strain.

The same is true of space domain awareness. Knowing what is in orbit is one thing. Understanding intent, and being able to act on it in time, is another. That requires systems that can process sensor data and respond quickly. In practice, that tends to push systems toward greater autonomy, if only because events can move too fast for a human operator to control them continuously.

This is not yet reflected consistently in how our systems are designed or procured. Much of the current architecture still assumes a degree of stability that is unlikely to hold in a contested environment.

The result is a gap between the resilience that is described in the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) and the resilience that would actually exist in the next fight.

As it is, Britain is investing heavily in programmes like SKYNET, ISTARI and Oberon, and this is important; but the shape of our defence investment matters more than just investing. Concentrating capability into a small number of high-value systems that depend on constant control does not amount to resilience, and that is what decides whether the force works at all.

A force built around a small number of satellites gives an enemy a clear point of attack. Once those satellites are disrupted, the effects will be felt quickly and severely across every other domain.

We need change. We need more systems, working together, designed from the outset to keep working through disruption rather than assuming disruption can be avoided. The systems that tend to hold up best are the ones that spread risk, adapt quickly and keep working even when parts of them fail.

This won’t be easy, but it’s necessary. Space now sits upstream of how modern forces operate. If space degrades, everything downstream of it does as well. If it holds, on the other hand, then the rest of the force has a fighting chance of holding with it.

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Graeme Ritchie is the CEO of Shield Space

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