The government's new plan to combat foreign influence has an impressive name and not much bite

13 March 2025, 13:02

By Dr Stepan Stepanenko

Set to combat foreign influence in British politics, the government’s Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS) will soon come into effect.

It is supposed to identify who is acting on behalf of foreign states, and ensure that there is some form of prior vetting for the people who roam the halls of Westminster. Yet, when the Intelligence and Security Committee reported back in 2020 that “Russian influence in the UK is the new normal,” one must wonder if we are still truly doing enough to ensure there are no loopholes in the new scheme.

Two questions come to mind before the FIRS takes effect. First, who is it actually targeting, and who will bother to register?

At face value, it seems designed for anyone who is paid by a foreign power to influence British politics. Under the scheme’s “political tier,” receiving payment to sway an MP or otherwise shape our political process becomes a criminal offence if it goes undeclared, but how likely is it that the people who mean real harm will openly comply?

Known Russian efforts to influence Westminster offer little reassurance. Take the Nalobin scandal, the subject of Sergei and the Westminster Spy Ring podcast, where a Russian diplomat tried to cultivate influence within the Conservative Party. Under this new scheme, would this have been blocked or even disclosed? No, as diplomats do not need to register.

And there are many more loopholes to avoid detection. A lobbying group or think tank that is indirectly funded, such as through general “donations”, wouldn’t need to register either, as indirect support is not controlled. As long as they keep their activities comfortably vague and aligned with the interests of a foreign government, they can slip under the radar. Some British foreign-policy think tanks have been doing precisely this for years.

Another curious omission from registration requirements is made for news publishers. In cases like the purchase of The Independent by members of the Lebedev family, whose KGB ties are well-documented, the scheme would pose no problem. Meanwhile, as the Intelligence and Security Committee report warned, “there are a lot of Russians with very close links to Putin who are well integrated into the UK business and social scene, and accepted because of their wealth”.

With enough pre-existing wealth and connections to exert considerable political influence, there’s no need to keep in direct contact with the Kremlin or sign on to any register in order to exert influence. Take the recurring stories of political funding by the Chernukhins, Timekro and other Russian emigres as examples.

Who knows how many Russian kleptocrats with strong ties to the Kremlin are already in the UK with substantial resources at the ready, to influence British politics? Just think back to our old “golden visa” scheme, which the UK used to grant freely to wealthy foreign nationals, allowing them and their children to settle here, and later acquire British citizenship.

Bill Browder, once the largest investor into Russia, reflecting on Putin’s years in power said to Parliament’s Treasury Committee last year that “1 trillion US dollars was taken out of Russia during this 24-year period”,  showcasing how the scheme’s limitations almost invite abuses by people who have already quietly built ties to both Russia and the UK.

The scheme also allows a 28-day grace period for registration, or 10 days for countries deemed “enhanced.” That countdown starts from the moment an agreement is made, but one can easily put all sorts of plans in motion before finalising a contract, and 28 days is ample time to court a fair number of British politicians before any foreign links are required to be declared. It doesn’t help that the UK still hasn’t settled on which countries are “enhanced.” Iran is on the list, but Russia is not. An omission that is difficult to understand unless there’s an intention to sweep existing links under the carpet.

Yet, the loopholes don’t stop there. If an entity that is supposed to register hires a third party to do the actual lobbying, that subcontractor would fall through the gaps. Think of it like funnelling funds through a UK-based shell company. The main firm might follow the rules on paper, but good luck tracing the money or the real agenda if the lobbyists and think tanks, especially as they refuse to name their clients and funders.

But with any new scheme or law, the proof is in the pudding of enforcement. Without a major police investigation into each suspect case, at great expense to the British taxpayer, there is no reliable method to confirm who should be on the register in the first place.

So, again, who is actually going to sign up? Certainly some business groups or investment arms that openly carry a foreign government’s name will do so. But the more influential think tanks, lobbyists, and especially those with the biggest secrets to hide will probably carry on as before.

That leads us back to the original question: who is this scheme really aimed at? It starts to feel like it is more about soothing public anxieties than genuinely clamping down on foreign interference.

I’m not suggesting that it’s a bad idea. The FIRS is definitely a step in the right direction. Yet, if we truly want transparency, we need more than a register that can be dodged by spending 20 minutes and £50 to create an intermediary company.

We ought to see public diaries of meetings held by peers and MPs, so we don’t have to rely on leaked stories about who tosting whom at the Russian embassy. We also deserve to know the full list of golden visa holders over the years, so we can have a proper sense of how many Russian kleptocrats made themselves at home here.

As it stands, we have a scheme with an impressive name and not much bite.

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Dr Stepan Stepanenko is a British-based political analyst specialising in Eastern European and post-Soviet affairs, sanctioned by Russia for his work with opposition movements. He has co-founded a foreign policy think tank, and regularly contributes to major media outlets on foreign policy and security.

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